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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
~.\.N .IUAN COUNTY and STATE
re.\X COl\LMISSION OF UTAH,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
VS

Case

No.

10146

.1 l1:N, INC., a corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and respondent (hereinafter the parties
\\"ill be referred to as plaintiffs and defendant) agrees
with the State1nent of Facts by plaintiffs so far as stated.
For convenience defendant will briefly summarize the
procedure and include a brief statement of admitted
facts.
The case as argued before the trial court was on a
motion to dis1niss plaintiffs' complaint. The memorandum decision written by Judge Keller (and which is a
part of the record) held for the defendant on the ground
that there could be no personal liability for real property
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taxes. Thereafter, additional facts not set forth in the
complaint were stipulated, and the formal judgment of
the court was entered as on a motion for summary
judgment. (All emphases are added by defendant unless
otherwise indicated.)
The admitted facts are:

1. The defendant owned and operated ·The J en, The
Jackie, Uncle Ben, Pasco, and a part of the Enigma
F·raction mining claims during 1957, 1958, and a part
of 19·5·9·.
2.. In December of 1959, the mining claims were
worked out, had no further value and were formally
abandoned by defendant. Defendant's title thereupon
ceased and defendant has not owned said mining claims
at any time during the years 1960, 1961, and 1962.
3. Defendant filed the required reports on forms
furnished by the tax commission for all of the years it
operated, the 19·59 operations being reported in 1960.
The 1960 report expressly stated that it was filed without
admission of any liability for the payment of the ad
valorem tax for the year 1960.
4. The state tax commission assessed the ad valorem
tax for 1960 based upon the average net proceeds for
the years 19·57, '58, and '59 at $288,204.50.
5. This tax was not paid and there was an automatic
sale· of the property in January of 19Gl, pursuant to
Section 59-10-33 Utah Code Annotated, 19·5·3.
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a.
li. ~imilar assPsstnents were 1nade for the years

1961 in the amount of $:2:2:2,:240.66 and 1962 in the amount
ol' $11J,(iG1.96 with the consequent tax sales the following
.I an nary, the~w taxPs being calculated upon a three-year
avt•ragt•, tlw operations for 1960 and 1961 being calulated
at zero.
STATE~lENT

OF POINTS

Dt>fPndant relies upon the following points to sustain
tht• judgment of the trial court:
POINT I
ASSUMING A "PERSONAL LIABILITY," THE STATE
TAX COl\Il\IISSION HAS NO RIGHT TO SUE.
POINT II
ASSUMING A "PERSONAL LIABILITY," SAN JUAN
COUNTY HAS NO RIGHT TO SUE.
POINT III
THERE IS NO "PERSONAL LIABILITY" FOR REAL
PROPERTY TAXES, INCLUDING REAL PROPERTY TAXES
BASED UPON NET PROCEEDS.
POINT IV
EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFFS OR ANY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR TAXES,
THAT JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN ENTERED AND
THERE l\IAY NOT BE ANOTHER JUDGMENT.
POINT V
THE JUDGMENT PROVIDED FOR BY SECTION 59-10-1
WAS SATISFIED BY THE TAX SALE TO SAN JUAN
COUXTY PURSUANT TO SECTION 59-10-33.
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POINT VI
IN THIS CASE THERE CAN BE NO VALID AD VALOREM REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR 1960, 1961, AND 1962
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO PROPERTY
VALUE AT ANY TIME DURING SAID THREE YEARS.
POINT VII
IN THIS CASE THERE CAN BE NO VALID AD VALOREM REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEARS 1960,
1961 AND 1962 FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO
OWNERSHIP BY THE DEFENDANT DURING THE YEARS
IN QUESTION.
POINT VIII
THE REGULATIONS OF THE TAX COMMISSION AND
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION BY THE 1963 LEGISLATURE
ARE RECOGNITIONS OF THE INEQUITY OF THE TAX
AND ITS INVALIDITY UNDER SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF
ARTICLE XIII UTAH CONSTITUTION.
POINT IX
A PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 59~5-57 REQUIRES THE ELIMINATION OF THE TAXES FOR 1961
AND 1962.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ASSUMING A "PERSONAL LIABILITY," THE STATE
TAX COMMISSION HAS NO RIGHT TO SUE.

This is the question argued as Point I by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs cite only statutory provisions. We call attention to Section 59-8-2, U.C ..A., 1953, which provides:
". . . and the whole tax shall be carried into a
column of aggregates, and shall be collected by the
county treasurer at the time and in the manner

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

provided hy law for collecting state and county
taxes."
~\'P

more particularly as to net proceeds tax, Section
;JD-5-65, which provides:
"The tax mentioned in the preceding sections on
mines and mining claims, and mining property,
shall be collected and the payment thereof enforced in the manner provided for the collection
and enforc(_'lnent of other taxes; ... "
Thi~,

it ~eems to us, is a sufficient answer to the argulllPnt that the tax eounnission has the right to a judgment
a~ain~t the defendant. Plaintiffs' sole authority appears
to be Section 59-5--±G, U.C.A., 1953, which is a general
right in the tax cmnmission to sue and to be sued in its
mn1 na1ne. Certainly this general power does not entitle
the state tax com1nission in its own name to perform
tlw funetions expressly given to the taxing authorities
of tlw counties. The state tax commission is not authoriz€'d to collect the taxes in question with or without suit
or to give a receipt therefor. As above-mentioned and
8tated by plaintiffs, the taxes on mines, though the mines
are assessed by the tax commission, are collected by
the count!J trea.surer.
Other sections show that though the tax commission
makes the assessn1ent, the assessed valuation is given by
the ta.~ con1mission to the county assessor and the procedure for collection is entirely by the county treasurer.
~ee Sections 59-5-2 ; 59-6-2, where the county assessor
must enter the amount assessed by the tax commission on
the assessment roll of the county; 59-8-8, where the
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county auditor charges the county treasurer ''with the
full amount of taxes levied except for taxes of car
companies and automobiles, motor stages, motor transports and trailers employed in common-carrier business;"
59-10-12, which requires the county treasurer to give a
receipt to all persons paying taxes; 59-10-13, which requires the county treasurer to make settlement with
the county commission for all monies collected. If these
things must be done by the county officials, how can
the money be collected by or paid to the state tax commission~ A judgment by the commission requires payment to the tax commission.
It may he interesting and helpful to note other sections of the statute expressly conferring upon the state
tax commission the right to collect other taxes or take
action with respect thereto. Under Sections 59-10-20 and
59-10-30 the tax commission is given express authority to
collect taxes on the property of "car companies and the
owners of automobiles, motor stages, motor transport and
trailers employed in common-carrier business." Under
Sections 59-10-23, 24 and 25, the state tax commission is
empowered to take certain action in case of threatened
depletion of mines or mining claims. Certain specific
steps must be taken by the tax commission. That procedure is not involved in this case. Even if it were, it
does not provide for personal liability.
·The failure of plaintiff to cite a single case where the
state tax commission or a county of this state has been
permitted to sue to collect ad valorem taxes is the answer
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in itself to thi~ question. There is no statutory authority
l'or Pitlwr the statt> tax conunission or a county to sue.
POINT II
ASSUMING A "PERSONAL LIABILITY," SAN JUAN
COUNTY HAS NO RIGHT TO SUE.

Plaintiffs at the outset concede that suit in the name
or t IH' ('Otmty treasurer "perhaps would have been more
appropriate." The sections relied upon for the right of
Nan Juan Count;' to sue are 17-4-3; 17-5-24; 17-5-50; and
17-5-54. These are all general statutes not specifically
rt'iating to the right to bring a suit to collect taxes. That
such statutes do not mean that in every circumstance
the county can sue and be sued is stated in Shaw v. Salt
/,ake County, 119 Utah 50, 224 P.2d 1037. In referring
to Section 17-4-3 (1), which gives the county the power
"to ::me and to be sued," the court said
"Subdivision (1) of this section is but a
general grant constituting the county an entity
to sue and be sued, where it may under other applicable stattdes or principles, properly be sued
or sue ; it is not a blanket authorization for suits
to be brought against counties.''
The other section noted by plaintiffs is 59-10-16,
which, as pointed out by plaintiffs, gives the county
treasurer the right to sue in the name of the county where
personal property, after being assessed, is removed
from one county to another. Plaintiffs state on page 5
that there is no other provision "allowing the treasurer
to sue or be sued." Plaintiffs have omitted to mention
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Section 59-11-11 which permits suit against the treasurer
of the county where taxes have been paid under protest.
The argument seems to be that since the statute does
not specifically give the county treasurer the right to
sue to collect taxes on the basis of a "personal liability,"
therefore, the suit may he brought in the name of San
Juan County. Admittedly, our statutes do not give the
county treasurer the right to sue for a personal judgment. This does not mean, however, that the county has
the right to sue. It rather indicates that there can be no
suit. In addition to sections relating to the duties of the
county treasurer with respect to taxes, cited under Point
I, we call attention to Section 17-16-11 which places the
county treasurer under bond for the safe-keeping of all
monies and Section 17-24-1 to 17-24-21 which give to the
county treasurer full responsibility for county funds.
That the county cannot take over the responsibility
of statutory county officers is indicated in the case of
Sheriffof Salt Lake County v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 71 Utah 593, 268 Pac.
783. In this case the county commission attempted to
remove a deputy county sheriff. The statute provided
that deputies could only be appointed with the consent
of the county commissioners. Nevertheless, it was held
that the discharge of a deputy was the sole responsibility
of the county sheriff, and that the county commission
could not upsurp that function. The court said:
"The sheriff's office is an elective office of
the county, as is also the office of a county commissioner, and is a coordinate office or branch
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of our eounty government. His powers and duties
an~ prt>~-wrilwd by statute and are similar to those
gl'Jwrally prt>~eribed by other western states.
In pc rfo rming them, he, generally spe·aking, acts
i11depcndelltl.lJ of the board of county commissioners except as otherwise restricted and specified by statute."
At this point ·we call attention to the fact that the
t·omplaint is in the fonn of two causes of action, one by
the statP tax conunission and the other by San Juan
t 0unty. The complaint prays for judgment for the full
amount of the tax in both causes. In other words, it asks
for a judgment in favor of the state tax commission for
the full a1nount of the taxes and for another judgment
in favor of San Juan County for the full amount. Plaintiffs do not state or claim to know which plaintiff should
han' judgment.
1

Plaintiffs' brief claims only that the state tax commission may join in "an atternpt to collect taxes due for
and on behalf of San Juan County." (page 5·) With re~pect to the right of San Juan County to sue it is concPded in plaintiffs' brief as above mentioned, that suit
in the name of the treasurer "perhaps would have been
more appropriate." (page 5)
POINT III
THERE IS NO "PERSONAL LIABILITY" FOR REAL
PROPERTY TAXES, INCLUDING REAL PROPERTY TAXES
BASED ON NET PROCEEDS.

It should be kept in mind that the so-called "net
proceeds tax" is an ad valorem real property tax. The
net proceeds fornn1la is merely a means by which the
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value of the property is assessed. Should this court hold
that there is "personal liability" for real property tax,
then all property owners may be sued. We submit that
this would be a very far reaching decision, would give
rise to many difficulties, and be a deterrent to the ownership of real property. The question of who is the owner
is sometimes a difficult one and calls for judicial determination, not administrative. Be that as it may, the question is whether or not our tax laws as now constituted
do provide for "personal liability."
An interesting statement in plaintiffs' brief is found
on page 6 where it is stated:
"·The primary question presented to the Court
is whether a mining company incurs personal liability by depleting mineral assets, paying no tax
thereon, and then abandoning the depleted mining
claim, the fee title to which was never owned by
it."
This suggests that the plaintiffs have in mind some special ''personal liability" with respect to real property
taxes on mining claims which do not apply to taxes on
real property generally. We submit that there can be no
different rule with respect to ad valorem real property
taxes on unpatented mining claims than on patented mining claims or all other real property. Authorities relied
upon by plaintiffs must apply equally to all real property
taxes.
The only Utah statute relied upon by plaintiffs is
Section 59-10-1 quoted at page 7 of their brief and the
only Utah cases are Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169
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P.~d 781; Crystal Car Line et al u. State Ta.c Commission
of Utah, 110 Utah -!:2(), 17-! P.:2d 984; and Crismon,
..lsst·ssor, wul Suit Ll~ke County v. Reich, 2 Utah 111.

The earliest Utah case on the subject is Crismon,
County .Assessor, et al u. Reich, 2 Utah 111, cited by
t itP plaintiffs. In that case, the plaintiffs asked for
a personal judg1nent. The court expressly held that
no pt'r:-;onal judgn1ent could be taken. Plaintiffs' attempt
to tab' emnfort frmn this case because in rnaking its
ruling the court stated that:
". . . when ample powers and means are afforded
by statute for the collection of taxes without suit,
and when there is no statute providing for suit to
be brought for taxes, no action can he maintained
therefor." (page 5 of plaintiff's brief)
The court did not hold that just because the state, the
county, or the county treasurer has not been able to
collect taxes that there is then created a personal liability.
Another early case following the Reich case is Kerr
v. lroolcy, 3 Utah 456, where it is simply stated in the
headnote reflecting the decision of the case that "Suit
i::; not the proper ren1edy for the collecting of a tax unless
l'xpressly given by statute."
In the case of Richards 1:. State Tax Commission,
9:2 rtah 503, 69 P.2d 515, the plaintiff brought suit
against the tax commssion and others for the purpose
of quieting title to property which plaintiff had purrhased from the county after the receipt by the county
of a tax deed. Apparently the purchase price from the
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county was for less than the taxes, and it was claimed
by the defendant tax commission that the taxes were not
extinguished by a sale to the county. The court said:
"Taxes are levied against the property. The property against which the levy is made is subject to
the processes and procedure relating to the collection, and disposition of the property in event
the owner or any one interested in the property
neglects or refuses to pay taxes properly assessed.
When the tax law remedies have been exhausted,
there is no debt or liability existing due to the
state or any subdivision thereof from the former
owner, or for that matter, from a purchaser after
he has pa.id the agreed price and accepted conveyance."

Plaintiffs place some reliance upon the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in the case of Ra;yes v.
Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169· P.2d 781. After quoting from
statutes Mr. Justice Wolfe stated:
"Certainly this smacks of an assessment
against the person rather than a charge against
the realty alone - the tax debt being a lien
against the realty of the owner."
An analysis of the Hayes v. Gibbs case clearly indicates
that Mr. Justice Wolfe was only speculating and he was
not determining that a personal judgment could be taken
against the owner of real property for taxes. The question in the case was whether or not, when the defendant
Gibbs purchased the property at tax sale from the
county, certain building restrictions in the chain of title
continued or whether the restrictive covenants no longer
existed. In other words, did the tax title create an en-
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t i rt>ly new fet~ ~intple title. The majority opinion by
.JI r. .J ll~tiet> Lar~on and concurred in by Justices Wade
and ~I e Donongh silnply held that the restrictive covenants wt>n' not Pxtingished by the tax sale. It was pointed
out that the a::-~sessed valuation was based on the fact that
there were restrictive covenants which applied to the
Pntin• area and that the restrictive covenants therefore
constituted a part of the title sold at the tax sale. See
ht'<Hlnotes 11, 12, and 13.
~lr. Justice Wolfe wrote a concurring opinion pointing out the danger of putting decisions on any particular
theory. He stated:
''While I am in agreement therefore with the
result that easements and building restrictions
are not extinguished by valid tax foreclosure procedure, I run doubtful as to the reason given for
that result. In order to assure myself of the
correct basis I would be compelled to make an
exploration which would consume much effort
and time. After all, the holding in this case rather
than the ascertainment of the correct reasons for
it is of paramount importance." (page 71)
.Jlr. Justice Wolfe expressly pointed out that statutes
permitting a personal liability were repealed by the
1933 revision of our statutes. He stated at page 76 of
the Ftah report:

·'Section 6090-6092, Compiled Laws of Utah
1917, provided for personal suit against a tax
debtor for the delinquent tax when there was no
sale of the property upon which the tax was a lien
when said property ·was once offered for tax sale.
These sections did not survive the 1933 revision
of the statutes."
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Mr. Justice Wolfe further stated :
"It may be that the tax is one against the person
but the procedure to collect it confined to the
sale of his property and in that sense a proceeding in rem although Sec. 80-10-3 and some of the
other sections would seem to be somewhat against
that view." (page 76)
From the foregoing, it is clear that Mr. Justice
Wolfe in the Hayes v. Gibbs case did not conclude that
there could be a "personal liability." He rather leaned
to the theory that the only procedure to collect the tax
was against the property itself. His final conclusion
was that:
'~Because of public necessity, I agree that mortgages and most other liens, including tax liens
and most likely dower and some other interests,
are extinguished by valid tax foreclosure procedure but not easements." (page 77)

Plaintiffs cite and rely upon the case of Crystal Car
Line et al v. State Tax Commission) 110 Utah 426, 174
P.2d 98'4. This case was decided November 29, 1946, approximately six months after Hayes v. Gibbs. Plaintiffs'
brief contains two quotations from this case. The first
from the majority opinion, by Mr. Justice Wade, that:
"The statutory provision that 'every tax has the
effect of a judgment against the person' means
that the tax shall be collected in the same way a.s
a judgment unless otherwise expressly provided
and limited." (page 8 plaintiff's brief)
The second is from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Larson wherein he states:
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. 1 ~ue no n~ason why an action 1nay not lie
for unpaid taxe8 on personal property where the
~nmrnary proeueding of seizure under the tax laws
is not pradical." (pages 8 and 9 plaintiff's brief)
N('i ther of tlH'8P quotations, even if they represented

the holding of the case, apply to the present situation.
lf the first quotation is applied to the present case, someonl', possibly San Juan County, has a judgment as provided for in Section 59-10-1, and this judgment must be
t•ol!Pdt•d a~ provided for in Chapter 10 of Title 59. There
ii:i already a judgment which must be collected as therein
provided and there is no provision for a deficiency judgnwnt. The second quotation by Mr. Justice Larson
n•lates only to unpaid taxes on personal property.
rrlw Crystal Car Line case did not hold that a per-

sonal judg1nent was possible even for personal property
taxl's, and certainly did not hold that there could be
pl•rsonal liability for real property ad valorem taxes.
The case arose upon the seizure by the tax commission
of ears of the Crystal Car Line to satisfy taxes imposed
under our statute by the tax commission and collectible
by the tax cmnmission under the then Section 80-10-29,
F.C.4\., 1943, now Section 59-10-30, U.C.A., 1953. The
court having held that the cars were properly seized, the
qnl'stion 1n1s then whether or not the action was barred
by the statute of limitations. On this point, the problem
before the court was stated as follows by Mr. Justice
'Yade:
"However, unless the seizure of this car for the
purpose of sale, under section 80-10-29, U.C.A.,
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1943, by the tax commission was "an action" as
that term is used in section 104-2-24.10, the commission has not brought nor is it attempting to
maintain an action in this case and it is not barred
by that section. In Crismon v. Reich, .·2 Utah
111, we held that in the absence of an express
statutory provision to that effect the county
assessor may not bring an action to collect taxes
but is limited to the summary proceedings provided by statute for that purpose. It is immaterial here whether or not the tax commission may
bring a. separate action to collect this tax. Our
problem is whether or not the proceeding to seize
and sell one of the cars of one of the plaintiffs
which the tax commission is attempting constitutes an action. If so, then such proceeding is
barred by section 104-2-24.10-otherwise it is not
barred." (pages 438 and 439')
1

The opinion of the court held that the action brought to
collect the taxes by seizure was barred in eight years,
the court applying the statute of limitations with respect
to judgments. The court quoted Section 80-10-l, U.C..A..,
19·43, now Section 59-10-1, U.C.A., 1953, that "Every tax
has the effect of a judgment against the person, . . ."
Since the question was only the application of the statute
of limitations, the point now before the court was not
decided. Recognition was given to Crismon v. Reich
that in the absence of express statutory provision no
personal action can be brought for the collection of taxes.
Mr. Justice Wolfe dissented on the ground that
the judgment referred to in Section 59-10-1 was not the
ordinary judgment which was barred by the eight year
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~tatute o I'

Iimitations. Whatever Mr. Justice Wolfe said
in the <'at·w of Hayes v. Gibbs that the statute "smacks
of an a~~wss1nent against the person" was cleared up by
hi~ contrary conclusion in the dissenting opinion of the
Cry~tal Car Line case. The following quotations from
the di~~Pnting opinion demonstrate this point:
"B'~r..t

our tax statute providing for ad valorem
taxes on real and personal property do not contain auy general provision for bringing an action
for the tax and thus obtaining a judicial judgment
for it although there was at one time in our statutes provision for suit (Sections 6047, 6090-609 2,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 19'17) and there is now
provision for the court foreclosure on real estate
under certain circumstances (Sections 80-10-41
to 46, U.C.A., 19,43), and for suit to collect taxes
on livestock in special circumstances (Section
80-5-27, U.C.A., 1943). (p. 448)
1

"I do not think a legislative pronouncement
that a tax shall have the effect of a judgment
means the same thing as saying that it shall be
a judicial judgment which can only be obtained
by starting a court action. (p. 450)
"And since there is no statutory provision for
obtaining a judgment for taxes in a case like this
a judicial judgment cannot be had. Consequently,
there is no way in which to obtain a judgment
which would make the type of execution provided
for in Chap. 37 of Title 104 applicable. Hence the
eight years limitation which is part of 8ec. 104-371 does not apply." (p. 450)
~ls

pointed out by nir. Justice Wolfe if there ever
was any effective statutory authority for the filing of a
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suit for a personal judgment, such statutes were repealed
in 1933. Section 88-1-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933
provides:
"All acts of a general and permanent nature
passed by the legislature of the State of Utah
prior to its twentieth regular session are hereby
repealed, saving and excepting the following, subject to the limitations and exceptions herein
expressed, to wit:"
Plaintiffs on page 7 of their brief cite 51 Am. Jur.
Section 984 (erroneously cited 251 Am. Jur.). American
Juris prudence in laying down the rule on this question
clearly favors the defendant. We quote from Section
984 as follows:

"§ 984. Personal Action against Taxpayer.-In
many jurisdictions, taxes are by statute declared
to he debts due by, or are made the personal obligation of, the person or corporation owning the
property or doing the business upon which the
tax is levied or imposed, and are recoverable by
action ;8 however, unless declared so by statute, a
tax is not a debt in the sense in which the word
"debt" is ordinarily use.d. 9 In many cases it is
stated broadly that no personal action will lie
for the recovery of taxes, in the absence of express
statutory authority therefor. 10 Usually, however,
the rule is stated in a more guarded form that
where the statute which creates the tax provides
a~ special remedy for its collection, such remedy
is exclusive and preclttdes the bringing of a common-law action for the recovery of taxes. 11"
Plaintiffs rely upon the case of City of Anchorage v.
Baker, 376 P.2d. 482. A reading of that case indicates
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that thP pPr~onal liability arose out of a tax on a leasehold intPn'~t whvrP the govern1nent was the owner of the
property and wn~ the lessor. Footnotes 2 and 3 on page
-~,-.;~ and the body of the opinion clearly show that the
personal liability was based upon an amendment to the
~tatute ~pecifically allowing the personal action. The
l'ootnoh' states:
.. In 1962 the statute was amended so as to specifically allow a personal action to recover a tax on a
lvasehold interest in real property. S!LA 19'6,2,
Chapter 117."
Plaintiffs eite and quote at page 10 of their brief
from S-1 Corpus Juris Secundum Section 643 to the effect
that in many jurisdictions the owner of real estate is
personally liable for the taxes. Plaintiffs omitted the
preceding portions of that section. The preceding portion of the text is as follows::
•'At common law there is no personal liability
on the part of an owner for taxes levied on his
property, and under 1nany taxing systems there
is no personal liability for taxes imposed on real
property, although such taxes may constitute a
personal obligation which is satisfied and extinguished when the property is taken for the
amount due as taxes."
If there were cases cited by Corpus Juris Secundum
which are decided favorable to plaintiffs under statutes
similar to Ut.ah, it is presumed plaintiffs would have specifieally cited the cases. It is well established that at
Conunon Law· there was no personal liability. A specific
~tatute is necessary to change that law.

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
Counsel for both sides argued this case before the
trial court principally on statutory construction and the
decisions of our own Supreme Court which are cited
above and in plaintiffs' brief. The learned trial judge
wrote a memorandum decision in favor of the defendant
there being at the time nothing before the court except
the plaintiffs' complaint and the motion to dismiss.
The question of "personal liability" was the principal
question before the court and this was the principal point
upon which the decision was rendered in favor of the
defendant. The learned trial judge stated at page 7:
('Tr. P.16)
"In reaching the conclusions that I have expressed in this memorandum I have read the
various cases cited by counsel and have made my
own individual search. I list now a few of them
without stating to which particular point they
apply."
There are then cited seventeen cases, five from the State
of Utah and the balance from other jurisdictions. They
all support the proposition that there is no personal
liability for real property taxes. There is one Utah case
not hereinabove mentioned, Peterson v. Ogden City, 111
Utah 125, 176 P.2d 599. As stated in headnote 1, the case
held that Ogden City was restricted to the ordinance for
the procedure to enforce a special assessment and could
not foreclose a special assessment lien in a judicial procedure.
For the court's information, the following are the
cases cited by Judge Keller, which we· think are particu-
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larly in point and which we cite herein in support of
P()int Ill:
I~oa rd of Cmnrnissioners of Ness County v.
l I ooper et al, 110 I\::an. 501, 204 Pac. 536
llawkin~ v. Srnith, 106 Mont. 453, 78 P.2d 74
Ntah~ PX r<:>l. Spokane and Eastern Trust Co. v.
Nicholson, County Treasurer, 74 Mont. 346,
~-1:0 Pac. 837
Nantos v. Sirnon, 60 Ariz. 426, 138 P.2d 89'6
~Iaricopa County v. Arizona Tractor & Equipment Co., 57 Ariz. 49, 109 P.2d 618
~le Donald v. Duckworth, 197 Okl. 576, 173 P.2d
436
Allen v. I-Ienshaw, 197 Okl. 1123, 168 P.2d. 625
City of Salem v. Marion County, 171 Ore. 254,
137 P.2d 977
Pugd Sound Power & Light Co. v. Cowlitz
County, 38 Wash. 2d 907, 234 P.2d 506·.

\r e acknowledge our indebtedness to the learned trial
judge for this research and the many cases in other states
supporting his decision and the defendant's view. While
t':.teh ease could be analyzed, to do so would probably extend this brief beyond its proper size. However, we will
take the liberty of quoting from the case of Board of
Commissioners of v/ess County v.llooper et al, 110 Kan.
;)01, ~0-1 Pac. 536:
"It is argued for the county that although
there is no statute covering this subject the principle involved in the statutes relating to the disposition of personal property without the payment
of ta."'\:es can be invoked to help perfect a liability
on defendant in this case. In short, by a plausible
course of reasoning, the county board argues that
this court, by principles of analogy and deduction,
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should declare the law to be what the Legislature
itself could declare, but what the Legislature has
not yet declared - that where the owner of property willfully damages the realty by removal
of improvements therefrom he is personally liable
in damages to the county if the realty thus damaged will not sell for enough to pay the county's
lien for taxes. It can hardly be said that the want
of legislation on this subject arises through mere
oversight. More likely it arises through studied
restraint. Having the matter of loss of taxes and
evasion of taxes in mind, and having legislated
repeatedly touching the making away with personal property without payment of the taxes
thereon, the Legislature must have had its eyes
open to the fact that taxes on real estate are
occasionally lost or rendered uncollectable by the
destruction or removal of improvements from the
freehold. So frequently have owners of real estate
removed improvements therefrom without paying
the accrued and delinquent taxes that it cannot be
said that the Legislature has never considered the
subject. As early as 1889 the removal of improvements from mortgaged property to the prejudice
of the mortgagee had become sufficiently grave
to justify the fixing of statutory liabilities, both
civil and criminal, for such misdeeds. Gen. Stat.
1915,, §§ 6479-6481. The whole matter of taxation
is statutory; the means for the recovery of delinquent taxes is prescribed by statute, and does
not exist apart from the statute.
"Whatever the abstract merit of the county's
contention, it is one which should be addressed to
the Legislature, and not to the judiciary. The
judgment of the trial court was correct." (pp.
536-537).
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POINT IV
E\' EN IF THE PLAINTIFFS OR ANY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR TAXES,
THAT .JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN ENTERED AND
THERE MAY NOT BE ANOTHER JUDGMENT.

Plaintiffs strongly rely upon Section 59-10-1, U.C.A.,
1~)~>~1, for their right to sue in this case. Plaintiffs quote
the statute as follows :
"Every tax has the effect of a judgment
against the person.... The judgment is not s:atisfiPd nor the lien removed until the taxes are paid
or the property sold for the payment thereof."
It seems obvious that whatever judgment is authorizt>d by the foregoing section, that the judgment is alrPady entered. A second judgment cannot be based upon
a 8tatutP that says a judgment already exists. The learned trial judge well stated his position on this question, as
follows:
.. Furthermore, if the tax has the effect of a judgnlent what, one may ask, gives rise to the necessity
of bringing a suit before a judicial tribunal to get
another judgment." (page 5 of the memorandum
decision Tr. P. 14)
POINT V
THE JUDGMENT PROVIDED FOR BY SECTION 59-10-1
WAS SATISFIED BY THE TAX SALE TO SAN JUAN
COUNTY PURSUANT TO SECTION 59-10-33.

\Yith respect to the judgment provided for by Section 59-10-1, we quote again that "the judgment is not
~atisfied nor the lien removed until the taxes are paid
or the property sold for the pa.yment thereof."
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Certainly there is clear intent that the judgment
upon which plainiffs rely (and which existed without the
necessity of filing this action) was satisfied when "the
property (was) sold for the payment thereof." The
trial court in its memorandum decision gave this as one
of its reasons for judgment in favor of the defendant.
The proposition is weTI stated in the following language:
(Page 5 memorandum decision, Tr. p.14)
"In the interest of brevity I state merely the
sections, to wit; 59'-10-3, 59-10-29, 59-10-33 and
59-10-35 from which in my judgment one must
conclude that the judgment referred to in 59-10-1
is satisfied and which supports the position of the
defendant; namely, that the taxes claimed have
been paid by a sale of the property."
Plaintiffs claim that the remedy provided for by
the statutory provision cited by the trial court is "only
a cumulative remedy," citing Section 59-10-47, U.C.A.,
1953. An examination of the tax statutes clearly shows
that the remedy referred to by S.ection 59-10-47 as cumulative is a complete independent remedy not involved
herein. See Sections 59'-10-42 through 59-10-47. It is a
remedy by foreclosure. It is cumulative to the remedy
set forth in the sections referred to in the above quotation
from the opinion of the trial judge. It is significant
that no deficiency judgment is permitted in such proceedings.
Following the quotation from S.ection 59-10-47, plaintiffs (at pages 13 and 14) cite as apparent additional
authority as to cumulative rights the cases of Fisher
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v. Jr'ri,rJhl, 101. Utah -Hi!), 1:2:: P.:2d 703, and Auson v.
Hllisou et a!, 10-1- Utah raG, 1-1-0 P.2d 653.
ln tlu· Fish(•r emw a purchaser of a tax title was
nttPmpting to l'on•elmw a tax lien apparently pursuant to
~~·dion~ ;->D-1 0--1-:2 through 59-10-47, U.C.A .. 1953, the section~ at the ti1ne of this case being 80-10-41 through
,...;0-10--1-G R. S. l :., 1933. The court held that since the
plaintiff had rpct_•ived a tax title he could not again have
furt l~t·r proceedings by way of foreclosure. Speaking
a~ i I' the plaintiff "·en• in the position of the county (and
thi~ i~ tlw best position the plaintiff could claim), the
court ~aid:
.. If the county proceeds to satisfy its lien in the
ordinary way- by auditors deed and May salethere is no necessity for even considering the foreelosure proeedure as the latter is just another
way of accomplishing the same objectives - eollection of taxes."
The reasoning of this court, far from holding that
there is an alternative remedy by an action for "personal
liability," holds that if there is a sale to the county and
the eounty reeeives a deed there cannot also be an action
to foreclose. Applying this reasoning to our case, if the
tax constitutes a judgn1ent there cannot be a seeond
judgment. Furthermore the judgment is satisfied by the
sale to the county. The fact that there was a tax deed as
well as a preliminary sale in the above case does not
lh'l'Pssarily mean that the sale alone does not satisfy
the judgment as that is what Seetion 59-10-1 says.
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In the case of Anson v. Ellison the plaintiff was attempting to quiet title based upon an invalid tax deed.
Salt Lake City was a party defendant and claimed a lien
on the property for a special assessement. With respec1
to the right of the county and the question of the tax
debt and the right of the plainiff to have foreclosure,
the court said :
"The lien which is given to the county is a right
to resort to the property for the tax debt, but
where the tax debt is paid by a sale to a private
purchaser, the debt is paid and the right to resort
to the property (by the City for special assessment) is gone."
If this case is to be taken for anything, it is that
a sale of the property to the county pays the debt just
as stated in Section 59-10-1. It is submitted that authorities cited under Point IV in plaintiffs' brief fall far
short of indicating any statutory authority or precedent
by judicial decision for an action involving "personal
liability."
POINT VI
IN THIS CASE THERE CAN BE NO VALID AD VALOREM REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR 1960, 1961, AND 1962
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO PROPERTY
VALUE AT ANY TIME DURING SAID THREE YEARS.

The statutory provsion under which the taxes in
question were levied is contained in Section 59-5-57.
Until19·5·3 that statute provided as follows:
"All metalliferous mines and mining claims, both
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $5 per
acre and in addition thereto at a value equal to
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two timP~ tiH' net annual proceeds thereof for the
eah'tHlar yt>ar next preceding."
TIH' U););~ lugislatun', because of the fluctuation in
proet>l'(l~

l't'om year to Yl'ar an1ended Section 59-5-57 so
u~ to a~~PSS the mine on the basis of the average net
proceed~ for the 3 preceding years. The statute as
amPnd.Pd then read as follows:
"All Inetalliferous mines and mining claims, both
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $5
per acre and in addition thereto at a value equal
to two times the average net annual proceeds
thPrl'of for the three calendar years next preceding
or for as Inany years next preceding as the mine
has been operating, whichever is less." (Session
Laws 19·53, Chapter 107)
ThP result of this amendment as it has been interprPtt>d has had the effect of imposing upon worked out
mim's, taxPs, for 2 additional years. The actual effect
in this easl' has been to impose an ad valorem tax for
3 yetu·s after the property has become valuelss. (Ath'mpted relief by the tax commission with respect to
the second and third years is outlined under Point VIII
lwn'after.)

It is alleged in the complaint and agreed by the
stipulation that the property in question had no value
on January 1, 1960, or from that time on. See paragraph
j (Tr. P. ~) of plaintiffs' first cause of action and paragraph 5 (Tr. P. 19) of the stipulation. The allegation
with respect to the fact that the property had no value
aJ)pears to have been omitted from plaintiffs' second
eanse of action, but the stipulation still applies.
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While our constitutional provision, Section 4, Article
XIII provides that mining claims "shall be assessed as
the legislature shall provide," it does not state that mining property or property of any kind can be assessed for
ad valorem tax purposes where the property has no value
whatsoever in the year of the tax. The Constitution does
not say or even suggest that the legislature shall provide
for the taxation of mining claims based upon net proceeds
in years prior to the tax. It is the legislature which decided, in carrying out the constitutional provision, to
assess the property on the basis of net proceeds in prior
years. On the contrary, the Constitution, Sections 2
and 3 of Article XIII, require value in the year of the tax.
ARTICLE XIII
Section 2. "All tangible property in the state,
not exempt under the laws of the United States,
or under this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided
by law."
Section 3. "The Legislature shall provide by law
a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the State, according to its value in money, and shall prescribe by
law such regulation as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax, in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, .... "
An exact case in point and which has held that there
can be no tax where there is no value on January 1, of
the year of the tax of mining claims, is South Utah Mines
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/l('(l/'cr Co~ntty, 262 F.S. 325, 67 L. Ed.
::~;>. That <·ast- nro~P upon the ntten1pt of Beaver County
to tax ~onth Ftah ~I ines and Smelters for the year 1919
upon net proet-Pds in the prior year. South Utah Mines
and ~nwlb·r~ had net proceeds for the year 1918 from
workings of a tailings du1np. The mine itself was worked
out as of January 1, 1919. The United States Supreme
Court IH·ld su('h tax on the mine invalid because the net
proePPd~ for1nula bore no relation to value on January 1,
UlU), which value was zero. Mr. Justice Sutherland delivt>rPd the opinion of the court stating:

and 8ml'ltcrs

1'.

"The 'Constitution of Utah declares (§§ 2 and
3, art. 13) that all property in the state shall be
taxed in proportion to its value, and requires the
legislature to provide a uniform and equal rate
according to its value in money, and prescribe such
regulations as shall secure a just valuation for
the taxation of all property, so that every person
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion
to such value. By an amendment to § 4, art. 13,
adopted in 1918, it is provided that all metalliferous mines or mining claims, in addition to an
arbitrary valuation of $5 per acre, shall be assessed 'at a value based on some multiple or submultiple of the net annual proceeds thereof. All
other mines or mining claims and other valuable
n1ineral deposits, including lands containing coal
or hydrocarbons shall be assessed at their full
value.'
*

*

*

'·The state Constitution plainly contemplates
that all property, irrespective of its character,
shall be taxed 'according to its value in money.'
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"The provision with reference to the taxation of
metalliferous mines does not mean to depart from
this rule, but recognizes that their value cannot
be determined in the ordinary way, since the ores
which constitute the wealth of such property are
hidden in the earth, and, as a general thing, disclosure of their extent and character must await
extraction. The Constitution, therefore, provides
not for disregarding value in the assessment of
taxes upon mines, but for arriving at it in a
special manner, - that is, by a measurement proportioned to the net annual proceeds derived from
the property. The value of property bears a relation to the income which it affords. If it be property whose production is uniform and of indefinite duration, the capitalization of the net income
derived from it at the going rate of interest, in
the absence of a more certain method, will furnish
a reasonable measure of the value. The life of a
mine, however, is limited. The extraction of ores
from year to year constitutes a constant drain
upon the capital, which, in course of time, will be
exhausted. It follows that a given multiple of
the net proceeds, which may be a fair measure
of value in the early part of a mine's development,
will become excessive as the stage of exhaustion
approaches. The constitutional provision, therefore, at best, will produce only approximate equality. Undoubtedly, in fixing the multiple of (a31)
the net annual proceeds upon which the value of
metalliferous mines is to be calculated, a good deal
of latitude must be allowed the legislature and
the taxing authorities, but the power is not unbounded. Without attempting to delimit the bowndaries,-a matter primarily for the state courts,it is sufficient for present purposes to say that,
in our opinion, they have been clearly exceeded in
the instant case. The net proceeds here involved
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armw from a lot of refuse Inaterial, which, long
prior to the i1nposition of the tax, had been sevl'l'Pd frmn the 1nining claims, removed to a distmH'P, suhmitted to the process of reduction, and
stored upon lands separate and apart from the
claim~. ~I oreover, but one tenth of the amount of
tlwse net proceeds was realized by the owner of
tht> mining clain1s. To treble the total of these
pro<'t>Pds for the purpose of basing thereon an altogether fictitious value for a mine worked out
and worthless years before the adoption of the
statutory provision supposed to confer the authorit~' to do so results in such flagrant and palpable
injustice as would cast the most serious doubt
upon the constitutionality of such provisions if
thus construed.

* * *
"While the taxing authorities cannot be held
to an inflexible rule of equality, even in respect
of properties in the same classification where
their nature is such as to practically preclude the
application of such a rule, it does not follow that
all distinctions are to be ignored and indubitably
dissimilar and readily distinguishable things
treated as though they were the same. It may
well be that the taxable value of mines differing
in extent of development or in degree of exhaustion, and relatively of different actual values,
must, from the practical necessities of the case,
be subjected to the same rule of measurement,
although it 1nay work inequality to some extent.
But the difference between a mine from which
ore is still bei,ng or still may be extra.cted and net
income derired, ond one conceded to be an empty
shell, zcith no present or prospective value whatsoever, is so obrious that the imposition of a tax
upon the basis of their being, nevertheless, one
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and the same, cannot be sustained with due regard
for either law or logic."
Section 4 of Article XIII of our Constitution in effect
at the time of that case read as follows:
"Sec. 4. All metalliferous mines or mining
claims, both placer and rock in place shall be assessed at $5·.00 per acre, and in addition thereto
at a value based on some multiple or sub-multiple
of the net annual proceeds thereof." (1917 Session Laws P. 474)
The present Section 4, Article XIII of our Constitution
provides:
"All metalliferous mines or mining claims,
both placer :and rock in place, shall be assessed as
the Legislature shall provide; provided, the basis
and multiple now used in determining the value
of metalliferous mines for taxation purposes and
the additional assessed value of $5.00 per acre
thereof shall not be changed before January 1,
1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by
law. . . . "
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII relied upon by Mr.
Justice Sutherland in the South Utah Mines case that
there must be value in the year of the tax are the same
now as then.
In addition to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII, we
call attention to Section 1 which provides with respect
to revenue and taxation that the fiscal year "shall begin
on the first day of January unless changed by the Legislature."
POINT VII
IN THIS CASE THERE CAN BE NO VALID AD VALOREM REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEARS 1960,
1961 AND 1962 FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO
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OWNERSHIP BY THE DEFENDANT DURING THE YEARS
IN QUESTION.

A mining daitn is a possessory right resulting from
eompliatl<'P with Federal and State laws with respect
to t hP location of 1nining claims. It is this possessory
rig-ht that plaintiffs are clailning to tax. There must be
owtH'r~hip of property before there can be taxation. In
t'aet, there eannot be property in the legal sense without
tlwre hPing ownership. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"Property" as follows: (4th Edition page 1382)
"That which is peculiar or proper to any
1wr~on; that which belongs exclusively to one; in
the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which
arP guaranteed and protected by the government."
~eetion 59-3-1 in describing real estate provides:
" (a) The possession of, claim to, ownership
of or right to the possession of, land.
"(b) All mines, minerals and quarries in and
n;pder the land, all timber belonging to individuals
or corporations growing or being on the lands of
this state or the United States, and all rights and
pricileges appertaining thereto."
It is stipulated (paragraph 5 of the stipulation
Tr. P. 19, 20) that the 1nining claims in question had no
value in the years of the purported tax, that the last
mining operations were in December, 1959, and that in
December, 1959, defendant abandoned the claims and
"has not claimed ownership therein since before January
l, 1960/' That a mining claim ceases to exist on abandonn1ent, see :2 Lindley on :Jiines page 1593 where it is
stated: "Abandonment terminates a right." Also in
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Section·642 of 2 Lindley on Mines at pages 1589 and 1590,
there is a discussion "as to the character of the right
which is granted by the United States to a locator."
One of the characteristics of this right is RtatPfl as
follows:
" (3) His interest in the claim may also be
forfeited by his abandonment, with an intention
to renounce his right of possession. It cannot be
doubted that an actual abandonment of possession
by a locator of a mining claim, such as would
work an abandon1nent of any other easement,
would terminate all the right of possession which
the locator then had."
It follows from the stipulated fact of abandonment
in 19'59 that at no time during the three taxable years in
question did defendant have any ownership in the mining
claims in question. The mining claims as such ceased in
December of 1959.
Because there was no ownership, nor property belonging to the defendant, on or after January 1, 1960
there could not be a tax constitutionally imposed under
Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3, supra.
POINT VIII
THE REGULATIONS OF THE TAX COMMISSION AND
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION BY THE 1963 LEGISLATURE
ARE RECOGNITIONS OF THE INEQUITY OF THE TAX
AND ITS INVALIDITY UNDER SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF
ARTICLE XIII UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The position of the defendant in this case may cause
some anxiety with respect to the loss of taxes. If this
be so, we may likewise say that these taxes running for
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after a mine i~ worked out have been the cause
ot' nuxit>ty on the part of the defendant. Anxiety on
l'ithPr sidt- or both should, of course, play no part in the
dt•ei~ion of this cn~e, hut there is some history, of which
wn hPiiPVI' this court 1nay take judicial notice, and
rl'mPdial lt~gislation which we also believe should be
~·allt•d to the eourt's attention.
In 1~);>~) the tax connnission had promulgated the following rPgnlation ·with respect to the assessment of
unpatt•nted mining claims:
"The computation of net proceeds valuation
will l>t• handled as in the past, i.e., the prior three
~·pars' production will be considered in arriving
at value PVPn though mining has ceased and in
all eases a value will be assessed for three years
following the year in which production has
eeased; however, in the case of unpa.tented claims,
if a tilnely protest is made by the taxpayer, and
if in the opinion of the Commission the mineral
n1lues have been removed, the Commission may
order suspension of valuation based on prior net
proceeds in years following the first year immedintt'ly subsequent to that year in which production
ceased. It is the intention of the Commission to
apply a net proceeds valuation for the same
ntunber of years that the mine produced ore.
"There is no change in the methods used in the
rase of patented n1ining claims."
By an opinion dated September 29, 1959, the Attorney General held this regulation invalid.
The 1963 legislature, amended Section 59-5-57 by
inserting the following:
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" ... provided, however, there shall be no valuation based upon net annual proceeds of uranium
or vanadium mines for the purpose of assessment
of any such mine or mining claim for any one
year in which there were no gross proceeds realized in the year next preceding the year of assessment."
This amendment, if in existence at the time of the
taxes in question, would have relieved the defendant of
the tax for 1961 in the amount of $222,240.66 and the
tax for the year 19'62 in the amount of $113;661.9'6. Assuming but without admitting the net proceeds tax to be
valid in a case where the mine has been worked out
and legally abandoned the liability of the defendant
under the regulation of the tax commission cited above
would only be the first year's tax of $288,204.50 instead
of the total amount sued for ($6·24,107.12). Plaintiffs
have, nevertheless, stood firrn on their claim under the
statute for three years' taxes of $624,107.12. Defendant
does not criticize the tax commission for its attempt to
enforce the statutory provisions as interpreted by the
Attorney General. Defendant asks only that it not be
criticized or prejudiced for standing upon its legal rights.
Another amendment, not pertinent to this case, but
which will hereafter give relief to the State and counties
where ore bodies are of short duration was passed in
19'63 amending Section 5·9-5-65. That amendment provided:
". . . that the tax commission, in order to insure
the payment and collection of the ad valorem
property tax imposed against uranium and vala-
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dium mining- prop(•rtiP~, may require the owner
or tlw }H·rson engaged in mining the same to
dPpo::-;it with it ~uch security as the tax commission ~hall dd(•nnine."
The ::-;petion furthPr provides for the sale of the
~t·eurity whPn necessary. It would seem that this very
provi::-;ion i~ eontrary to the idea of "personal liability"
in tlw ::-;pn::-;p that an action can be maintained against
the owner.
POINT IX
A PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 59-5-57 REQUIRES THE ELIMINATION OF THE T'AXEiS FOR 1961
AND 1962.

It is the defendant's contention that there should
han• been no 1961 or 1962 tax under the statute prior to

tht• 1963 runend1nent. The language of Section 59-5-57,
as it existt>d in those years (and still exists for that
matter) was that metalliferous mines should be assessed,
.. . . . at a value equal to two times the average
nt>t annual proceeds thereof for the three calendar
years next preceding or for as many years next
preceding as the n~ine has been operating, whichever is less; ... "
It is our contention that under that language it was the
intention of the legislature that for there to be an assessment based on net proceeds the mine must have been
in operation in the year "next preceding." This con~trnrtion would allow only a tax for one year after
closing operations.
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CONCLUSION
In order to reverse the decision of the trial court,
this court must determine all of the following propositions to be true and correct :
1. Either the state tax commission or San Juan
County has the right to sue the defendant in this case
for a tax which is payable only to the county treasurer
of San Juan County and for which payment only the
treasurer of San Juan County can give a receipt.

2. There is a "personal liability" for real property
taxes by the owner.
3. Section 59-10-1, providing that "E,very tax has
the effect of a judgment against the person ... " may be
construed to mean that an additoinal judgment for
personal liability can be entered.
4. Even though Section 59-10-1 provides that "the
judgment (therein provided) is not satisfied nor the
lien removed until the taxes are paid or the property sold
for the payment thereof," such judgment continues even
though the property has been sold pursuant to Section
59-10-33, U.C.A., 19'5·3.
5. ·There may be a valid ad valorem real property
tax when in the year of the tax it is admitted that the
property taxed had no value.
·6. There may be a tax on real property when in the
year of the tax the defendant owned no property.
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7.

'rlwn~

is no violation of either Sections 2 and 3

ol' .\ rtit•l(' X lll of the Utah Constitution which requires

all tangihlt> propt•rty in the state to be taxed on "a uniform and t><tual rate of assessment" in cases where the
propt>rty ha~ no value and the defendant doesn't own it.
1

onvt>r~ely,

if this court finds that any one of the
l'on•going propositions is not true and correct, the judgttH'nt ol' tht> trial court Inust be affirmed.
(

The nw~t novel question in this case is the attempt
by tlw Ntatt> Ta..x Co1n1nission to impose personal liability
upon a taxpayer for failure to pay real property taxes.
A decision on this point alone is sufficient to dispose
of this ease.
Respectfully submitted ,

MARR, vVILKINS & CANNON
PAUL B. CANNON
Attorneys for Respondent
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